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1 Introduction 
In the past three decades, telecommunications regulation has often crossed 
ways with antitrust tools: suffice it to recall that the US telecoms sector was 
regulated for many years by the outcome of an antitrust case – the AT&T 
breakup in 1982. In the European Union, the 1998 regulatory framework 
already introduced competition policy tools in the regulation of 
telecommunications, and the 1998 Access notice was issued by the European 
Commission for the purpose of, i.a.,  ―set out access principles stemming from 
Community competition law as shown in a large number of Commission 
decisions in order to create greater market certainty and more stable conditions 
for investment and commercial initiative in the telecoms and multimedia 
sectors‖, as well as to define the boundaries between ex ante regulation and ex 
post competition law enforcement1. Today, the 2002 ―new‖ regulatory 
framework for e-communications largely relies on the concept of dominance 
(translated into Significant Market Power, SMP) as a precondition for the 
application of remedies by national regulators, and explicitly refers to 
Community competition law – thus, Article 82 of the EU Treaty – to define the 
features of SMP. Many other regulatory frameworks for e-communications 
worldwide rely on the use of antitrust tools to liberalise the telecommunications 
sector and gradually leave it subject only to ex post competition policy.  
                                                 
* Senior Research Fellow, CEPS, Brussels; Professor of ―Economic Analysis of Law‖ and ―EU 
policymaking‖, Luiss Guido Carli, Rome. 
1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:c:1998:265:0002:0028:en:PDF.  
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As telecom regulation initially focused mostly on efforts to liberalise markets 
that were characterised by the presence of one (public or private) monopolist, 
one of the antitrust tools that served regulators‘ purposes most directly was the 
―essential facility‖ doctrine. This doctrine refers to cases in which an 
undertaking controls an input or an asset, the replication of which is considered 
impossible or too costly from a legal, structural or economic viewpoint2. 
Accordingly, during the 1980s and 1990s it appeared to perfectly fit the 
condition of firms owning the only wireline infrastructure in their own 
countries. The AT&T breakup was inspired by the essential facilities doctrine as 
much as the European Commission‘s 1998 Access Notice, which carried a full-
fledged ―essential facilities test‖3. According to the latter test, when refusal to 
grant access by an essential facility provider would limit the development of new 
markets, or new products on those markets, or impede the development of 
competition on existing markets, the refusal is likely to have abusive effects and 
should be treated along the lines of the caselaw that developed on the 
application of Article 82 of the Treaty to refusals to contract by dominant firms. 
In the past few years, several other legal systems have adopted the essential 
facilities doctrine as the pivotal tool of their liberalisation efforts. This was also 
due to the incorporation of the concept in the WTO basic negotiation on 
telecommunications services. Today, countries like Canada, South Africa, 
Japan, Australia, and many others refer to this concept as one of the key 
elements of their regulatory framework for electronic communications.  
However, while the essential facilities doctrine is spreading like an oil spot, 
some of the most advanced countries have started to significantly depart from 
its application, either reneging it completely (like the United States) or 
expanding its interpretation well beyond the original boundaries (the EU). This 
interesting development in worldwide telecom regulation might in principle be 
attributed to a variety of causes: the failure of access obligations and ―stepping 
stones‖ approaches (especially in the US); the emergence of cable and wireless 
                                                 
2 See, i.a., Hovenkamp, H. J., Unilateral Refusals to Deal, Vertical Integration, and the 
 Essential Facility Doctrine (2008). U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-31.  
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:c:1998:265:0002:0028:en:PDF.  
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networks as competitors of wireline telecoms (which would put an end to the 
essential nature of wireline facilities); the need to provide a suitable 
environment for investment in next generation networks (NGNs); or the need to 
establish a clearer demarcation between the application of sector-specific 
regulation and ex post antitrust (as in the US after the Supreme Court decision 
in Trinko). 
Below, I describe the birth and evolution of the essential facilities doctrine, and 
comment on its application in the telecommunications sector. Section 2 outlines 
the emerging approaches in the regulation of high-speed broadband 
infrastructure, and the main consequences that may derive in terms of 
competitiveness and innovation in these markets. Section 3 concludes.  
1.1 The essential facilities doctrine in the US: rise, fall ... and rise 
again? 
In the United States, the essential facilities doctrine was implicitly applied for 
the first time in Terminal Railroad (1912) and then in cases such as Associated 
Press (1945), Loraine Journals (1951) and Otter Tail (1973); it was then 
explicitly formulated in 1977 in Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc.4 The doctrine was 
applied to the telecommunications sector already in MCI v AT&T in 1983: in 
that case, the 7th Circuit explained that  
“a monopolist‟s refusal to deal [...] is governed by the so-called 
essential facilities doctrine. Such a refusal may be unlawful because 
a monopolist‟s control of an essential facility (sometimes called a 
„bottleneck‟) can extend the monopoly power from one stage of 
production to another, and from one market to another”5.  
Accordingly, the conditions set by the 7th Circuit for imposing an antitrust duty 
to deal were: 
(i) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;  
                                                 
4 See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977).   
5 See MCI Communications, Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cur, 1983).  
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(ii) a competitor‘s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential 
facility;  
(iii) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and  
(iv) the feasibility of providing the facility. 
Even if the doctrine can be considered to be an elaboration of US courts, it must 
be recalled that it was only an elaboration of lower courts, not of the Supreme 
Court itself. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine 
in leading cases such as Aspen Skiing in 1985. This rejection was also inspired 
by the rather skeptical approach adopted by leading antitrust scholars, such as 
Philip Areeda (1989) and the famous treatise by Areeda and Hovenkamp6. In 
the following years, the Supreme Court approach was adopted and even made 
more explicit in Covad v. BellSouth and Metronet v. Qwest7.  
Regardless of the Supreme Court‘s denial of any ―essential facilities doctrine‖, it 
is safe to state – as Waller and Tasch (2009) recently did – that the doctrine has 
a ―long and proud history‖ in the US8. This is even truer for the 
telecommunications sector, as the doctrine inspired the US regulatory regime 
since the Modified Final Judgment that led to the break-up of AT&T in 1982, 
where the giant telecom operator had a monopoly in the local exchange 
network, which in turn was considered to be an essential facility9. The doctrine 
itself was applied to the telecommunications sector in subsequent years in other 
antitrust cases10. As a matter of fact, although the Supreme Court has avoided 
                                                 
6 See P. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L. 
J. 841 (1989), at 841; and Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (2d Ed. 2002). 
7 Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir 2002) (revd Bellsouth 
Corp. v. Covad Communications Co., 124 S. Ct. 1143 (2004), dismissed as to essential facilities 
on remand, 374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004); Metronet Servs. Corp. v. U.S. West Communs., 329 
F.3d 986 (9th Cir 2003) revd Qwest Corp. v. MetroNet Servs. Corp., 124 S. Ct. 1144 (2004); 
summary judgement granted to defendant on remand, Metronet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 
383 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2004). 
8 http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/pdfs/harmonizing_ess_fac.pdf.  
9 See Spulber, in Cave and Majumdar (Eds.) (2002). 
10 MCI v. AT&T; Southern Pacific v. AT&T. 
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imposing liability explicitly under the rubric of the essential facilities doctrine, 
every circuit court of appeals has done so explicitly11. 
With the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the concept of an essential facility (or 
―bottleneck‖) was put at the core of the regulatory approach, with the imposition 
of the obligation to unbundle network elements (UNE). More in detail, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act directed the FCC to issue regulations requiring 
incumbent local exchange carriers (―ILECs‖) to lease ―unbundled‖ elements of 
their local networks to competitors at regulated rates. The Act also required 
incumbents to lease the entire suite of network elements necessary to provide 
local telephone service—the ―unbundled network element platform‖ (―UNEP‖). 
As a result, the RBOCs were finally allowed to enter lucrative long-distance 
markets under the condition that they provided unbundled access to any 
entrant that wished to use part of their networks (the so-called Unbundled 
Network Elements or UNE) at just, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
conditions, based on the so-called TELRIC pricing.12  
The 1996 Act, initially welcomed with enthusiasm as a ―Camelot moment‖, soon 
proved to be inadequate to efficiently regulate the fast-changing US telecom 
industry.13 The two main problems emerged where the following:  
 mandatory unbundling obligations have been increasingly considered as an 
insurmountable hurdle for investments in (DSL) broadband deployment by 
RBOCs. In this respect, many economists have highlighted that charges to 
access the incumbents‘ UNE were insufficient to reward investments in 
infrastructure.14  
 the so-called ―silos‖ approach adopted by the Act – in which each type of 
service (broadcasting, telephony, cable television, information services) is 
subject to its own regulatory structure – seems to have hampered the level-
playing field, by creating an artificial ―regulatory apartheid‖ between sectors 
                                                 
11 See Elhauge, Defining better monopolization standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 261-62 (2003). 
And Spencer Weber Waller and William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities and Refusals 
to Deal, supra note 8.  
12 TELRIC stands for Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost. 
13 Senate Commerce Committee Hearing, Voice over Internet Protocol, Feb. 24, 2004.  
14 See, e.g., Hausman-Sidak 
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subject to common carriage obligations under Title II of the 1934 Act (the 
wireline companies); and sectors falling under Title III (which include 
satellite and wireless) and under Title VI (cable), which were generally 
exempted from common carriage obligations15. 
Needless to say, the application of the essential facilities doctrine in the 1996 
Telecommunications Act was hampered by this ―regulatory apartheid‖: whether 
a facility is replicable is indeed a question that depends on how the relevant 
market is defined: if the telecoms broadband network is kept artificially 
separated from the cable one, then viable replication ends up being confined to 
the replication of that same network, rather than deployment of alternative 
infrastructure that could compete with the copper one.  
In any event, the FCC gradually moved to eliminate regulatory apartheid by 
reaching a more technology-neutral regulatory framework: after declaring cable 
modem broadband services as an ‗information service‘ in 2002, it decided to 
forbear from imposing mandatory unbundling and pricing of FTTH in August 
2003, and extended its decision to FTTC in October 2004 and to DSL in 
September 2005. The FCC decision to forbear from imposing mandatory 
unbundling and price regulation on FTTC, FTTH and DSL reportedly provided a 
tremendous stimulus to investment in the US16. A ‗hands-off‘ approach to 
regulation was also applied to other high-speed technologies and IP-enabled 
services such as VoIP17. In summary, the US have reached a greater degree of 
technological neutrality than initially achieved with the 1996 Act. Such 
neutrality comes close to creating the level-playing field that is needed for 
                                                 
15 The definition of ―regulatory apartheid‖ was given by Peter Huber, quoted in Thomas W. 
Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 217 (1996). 
16 SBC Communications announced investments of $4-6 billion, Verizon planned investments 
totalling $15-20 billion and other providers, including incumbents like BellSouth, followed a 
similar strategy by announcing investments of $3-4 billion. Some commentators have argued 
that investments by regional incumbents (RBOCs) would have taken place anyway, given the 
intense competitive pressure exerted by cable operators, and were not significantly affected by 
the FCC announcements. 
17 The FCC has taken advantage of its legacy ―silos approach‖ by classifying VoIP as an 
―interstate information service‖ back in November 2004, therefore exempting it from state 
regulation just as cable modem services. More recently, the FCC started its IP-Enabled Services 
Proceeding in order to assess whether VoIP is to be considered a telecom or an information 
service. 
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infrastructure-based competition and fast, almost universal broadband 
coverage. As a result, although lifting up regulation for investments in high-
speed technologies might hamper access and investment by foreign players, 
such an approach appears to fit the US telecoms sector, due to legacy 
infrastructure–based competition. 
Where did this leave the essential facilities doctrine? The evolution of the US 
approach to telecoms regulation was inevitably linked to the reconsideration of 
the doctrine. This occurred with the collapse of the UNE regime in 2003, when 
the FCC released its Triennial Review Order (TRO), addressing the unbundling 
requirements of incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) under 47 U.S.C. § 
251. On March 2, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) issued its 
opinion in USTA v. FCC overturning key provisions of the FCC's triennial review 
order. The Appeals Court vacated those portions of the TRO that delegated to 
state commissions the authority to determine whether CLECs were impaired 
without access to network elements.  
Stating that the USTA II case marked the demise of the essential facility 
doctrine as a whole in the US would probably go too far. Important court 
decisions, such as the Microsoft III final judgment, came close to an application 
of the doctrine: Microsoft eventually committed to provide access at non-
discriminatory conditions to anybody who requested interoperability with 
Windows18. In the telecoms sector, it is probably more correct to observe that 
the application of the essential facilities doctrine was flawed, as the US 
regulatory regime had confined it into the very tight boundaries of the ―silos 
approach‖.  
However, a stronger wave of attacks soon came from the Supreme Court during 
the Bush Jr. administration, in particular with the Supreme Court decision in 
Verizon v. Trinko, where the Roberts Court established an important rule on the 
relationship between antitrust laws and sector-specific regulation in the field of 
telecommunications. The asset at hand in Trinko was exactly the UNE: a 
customer of the incumbent local phone service monopolist had brought a 
                                                 
18 See Renda, Catch me if you can, ... 
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private antitrust class action arguing that Verizon had denied competitors 
access to interconnection support services which impaired their ability to 
deliver, hence the customer‘s ability to obtain, local telephone service in the 
downstream market. The Supreme Court ruled that, where a government 
agency has powers to enforce access to a facility, the antitrust essential facilities 
doctrine does not apply. The Trinko decision thus entails that in the 
telecommunications sector, the application of the essential facilities doctrine 
relies entirely on the shoulders of the sectoral regulator, and should not be 
approached under the Sherman Act.19 The Court judges clearly stated that 
“We have never recognized such a doctrine, and we find no need 
either to recognize it or to repudiate it here”20.  
More specifically, the Supreme Court observed that, if it is in the FCC‘s 
competence to impose a sharing obligation, antitrust rules should not be 
juxtaposed with the regulator‘s decision not to impose access. In a nutshell, this 
means that, if the FCC has decided to lift access obligations on telcos, no 
essential facilities doctrine could be evoked to mandate access to the telco‘s 
network. The Trinko decision might be viewed as merely stating that sectoral 
regulation and antitrust law should be kept separate and should not overlap, in 
line with a general approach that has been adopted by US courts under the past 
decade, e.g. in the Credit Suisse decision. However, the skepticism towards the 
essential facilities doctrine seemed to be expressed rather generally by the 
Roberts Court: as two authors have recently stated, the decision marked ―the 
near extinction‖ of the doctrine21.  
Most recently, the attacked continued with the Department of Justice Report on 
single-firm conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in which the same 
arguments were reiterated with even stronger emphasis22. After quoting Areeda 
                                                 
19 This is partly overruling Otter Tail, where the overalp was allowed. See 
http://www.davidalbeck.com/writings/trinko.htm#_ftnref4.  
20 Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Verizon, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
21 See Frischmann, B. and S. W. Waller (2008), Revitalising Essential Facilities, Antitrust L. J. 
Vol 75, 2008.   
22 See US DOJ (2008), Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.  
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and Hovenkamp‘s statement that the doctrine is a ―label that beguiles some 
commentators and courts into pronouncing a duty to deal without analyzing 
implications‖, the Department observed that  
“the essential-facilities doctrine is a flawed means of deciding 
whether a unilateral, unconditional refusal to deal harms 
competition”23.  
In a nutshell, during the Bush Jr. administration the dominant approach in the 
US was that, if access to essential inputs is to be applied in the 
telecommunications sector, it is up to the FCC to consider it, and antitrust law 
cannot overlap with this decision. Against this background, the decisions by the 
FCC to abandon the UNE rule to award regulatory forbearance (often called 
―regulatory holidays‖) to companies investing in high-speed broadband 
networks such as FTTx and DSL between 2003 and 2005 virtually ruled out any 
possibility to apply the essential facility doctrine to mandate access to 
broadband infrastructure. The door to the essential facilities doctrine was de 
facto shut. 
Evidence of the repudiation of the essential facilities doctrine in the US can also 
be found in the recent linkLine case decided by the Supreme Court on 25 
February 2009. The plaintiffs had brought suit in 2003, alleging that AT&T 
violated §2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the DSL market in California. 
They alleged that AT&T refused to deal with the plaintiffs, denied the plaintiffs 
access to essential facilities, and engaged in a price squeeze. The Supreme Court 
could not directly apply Trinko as that case dealt with wholesale prices, and did 
not cover price squeeze allegations; however, the Chief Justice Roberts took the 
chance to clarify that ―[i]n this case, as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust 
duty to deal with its rivals at wholesale; any such duty arises only from FCC 
regulations, not from the Sherman Act‖24. Even more explicitly, concurring 
Judge Breyer observed that, in his view, ―a purchaser from a regulated firm 
(which, if a natural monopolist, is lawfully such) cannot win an antitrust case 
simply by showing that it is ‗squeezed‘ between the regulated firm‘s wholesale 
                                                 
23 Id. at 129. 
24 Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc., No. 07-512 (2009). 
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price (to the plaintiff) and its retail price (to customers for whose business both 
firms compete)‖. Moreover, ―[w]hen a regulatory structure exists to deter and 
remedy anticompetitive harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be 
greater than the benefits‖25. 
To sum up, it is fair to state that the essential facilities doctrine in the US has 
become only a regulatory issue, and only a narrowband story. It is not applied to 
broadband, and it was officially rejected by antitrust authorities.  
However, there are reasons to believe that the equilibrium reached during the 
Bush Jr. administrations is likely to be altered by the DoJ during the Obama 
mandate. First, the new Head of the DoJ Antitrust Division, Christine Varney, 
has been applying the rule in her past decisions and has immediately called back 
the 2008 DoJ Report on Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, which she considered to be inadequate26. Second, influential stakeholders 
such as the American Antitrust Institute have included the goal of ―revitalizing 
the essential facilities doctrine‖ already in their transition report sent to the 
Obama team during the presidential campaign27. Whether this will ultimately 
lead to a resurgence of the essential facilities doctrine in the US, it remains to be 
seen. Certainly, there seems to be an emerging consensus that, under some very 
specific circumstances, the essential facilities could still represent a viable 
solution to problems of insufficient competition: the statement by Ms Varney, 
which advocated for a more ―European‖ way to antitrust enforcement, probably 
hides a less hostile approach to mandatory access compared to the previous 
heads of the Antitrust Division at the DoJ. 
Most recently, the draft study conducted by the Harvard University‘s Berkman 
Center for the Federal Communications Commission concluded that access 
policy has boosted broadband penetration and deployment at relatively low 
prices for consumers, compared to the US regulatory holidays policy. This 
                                                 
25 Id.  
26 See Varney in Ciba-Geigy Sandoz: http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/09/04/Apr09-Gates4-28f.pdf 
27 AAI transition report 2008 see 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/Monopoly%20Chapter%20from%20%20AAI%
20Transition%20Report_100520082111.pdf 
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finding – doomed to pave the way to a hectic debate in the months to come – 
was mostly inspired by the observation that ―[i]n leading countries like Sweden 
and the Netherlands, following the earlier example of the United Kingdom, 
regulators are addressing the complexities of applying open access policy to 
next-generation infrastructure by pushing their telecommunications 
incumbents to restructure their operations and functionally separate their units 
that sell access to network infrastructure from their units that sell connectivity 
directly to consumers‖; and that ―countries that long resisted the 
implementation of open access policies, Switzerland and New Zealand, changed 
course and shifted to open access policies in 2006‖28. The Berkman Center‘s 
Report starkly contrasts with the almost unanimous findings of recent 
literature, including those by Waverman et al. (2007); Wallsten (2006); Wallten 
and Hausladen (2009); Grajek and Röller (2009); and Pietrunti (2009)29. All 
these studies found a negative correlation between access policy based on 
unbundling of the incumbent network and incentives to invest in telecom 
infrastructure, which suggest that mandatory sharing of essential facilities may 
have negatively affected dynamic efficiency. Whether the results of the Berkman 
Center‘s report will contribute to a change of attitude by US regulators vis à vis 
access policy in fixed-line (and even mobile) infrastructure, it remains to be 
seen.  
1.2 The essential facilities doctrine in Europe: alive and kicking 
The early developments of the essential facilities doctrine in the US had a 
remarkable influence in Europe, where the doctrine was welcome and applied 
                                                 
28
 See “Next Generation Connectivity. A review of broadband Internet transitions and policy from around 
the world”, Draft, October 2009.  
29 See, i.a., Waverman, L., M. Meschi, B. Reillier and K. Dasgupta (2007), Access Regulation 
and Infrastructure Investment in the Telecommunications Sector: An Empirical Investigation, 
LECG, September 2007; Wallsten, S., Whence Competition in Network Industries? Broadband 
and Unbundling Regulations in OECD Countries, December 2007, available 
athttp://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/s8.pdf; Wallsten, S. and S. Hausladen, Net 
Neutrality, Unbundling, and their Effects on International Investment in Next-Generation 
Networks, Review of Network Economics Vol.8, Issue 1 – March 2009; Grajek, M. And L.H. 
Röller, Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European Telecoms, 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2009-039, at http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2009-039.pdf; and Pietrunti, M., Regulation and investment 
incentives for next generation broadband access networks, forthcoming as EIB working paper. 
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by the European Court of Justice in a number of cases, initially related to port 
infrastructure (Sea Containers/Sealink, Europort AS/DBS) and then expanded 
to other network industries, including gas (Tiercé Ladbroke). Overall, the 
essential facilities doctrine was integrated into the doctrine of refusal to deal 
with competitors, and in the application of refusal to supply customers with an 
essential input. Since the late 1990s, the essential facilities doctrine surfaced in 
cases related to media distribution (Bronner) and copyright, where it was 
applied by EU Courts in a number of cases - Magill, IMS Health, and eventually 
in the landmark case against Microsoft. In these cases, the conditions that must 
be met for a finding of abuse of dominance were clarified. Overall, a refusal to 
supply by a dominant undertaking is considered to constitute an abuse of 
dominance whenever (i) the refusal falls on an essential asset (or in Microsoft, 
copyrighted interoperability information); (ii) the refusal is likely to exclude all 
competition in the downstream market; (iii) the refusal is such that it prevents 
the emergence of a new product (or, as in the CFI decision in Microsoft, limits 
the possibility of competitors to develop innovative products in the future); and 
(iv) the refusal is not objectively justified. 
The recent Guidance document on the treatment of exclusionary abuses under 
Article 82 also mentioned the essential facilities doctrine as a subset of refusals 
to deal by dominant undertakings. Paragraph 77 of the document clarifies that 
―[t]he concept of refusal to supply covers a broad range of practices, such as a 
refusal to supply products to existing or new customers, to license intellectual 
property rights, including when this is necessary to provide interface 
information, or to grant access to an essential facility or a network‖30. The new 
Guidance document also clarifies that Art. 82 can also apply to ―constructive 
refusals‖, i.e. cases in which the dominant undertaking unduly delays or 
otherwise degrades the supply of the product or imposes unreasonable 
conditions in return for the supply. 
The EU application of the essential facilities doctrine under Article 82 must also 
take into account a specific feature of Community antitrust law, which attaches 
                                                 
30 See COM(2009)864 final. 
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to dominant firms a so-called ―special responsibility‖ vis à vis its competitors31. 
This feature, still heavily discussed in the literature, can be interpreted as 
placing on essential facility holders an additional obligation to allow 
competitors to access downstream markets. In the case of vertically integrated 
essential facility holders, article 82 can apply also to the case of discriminatory 
abuses, in which the dominant firm applies different conditions to equivalent 
transactions, thus placing some or all competitors at a disadvantage. In this 
respect, the Guidance document on the treatment of exclusionary abuses article 
82 deals with margin squeeze cases as a special case of refusal to deal with 
competitors. The Commission clarifies that ―instead of refusing to supply, a 
dominant undertaking may charge a price for the product on the upstream 
market which, compared to the price it charges on the downstream market, does 
not allow even an as efficient competitor to trade profitably in the downstream 
market on a lasting basis‖. In these cases, the Commission will assess the 
exclusionary nature of the abuse by a price-cost test base on the LRAIC of the 
the downstream division of the integrated dominant firm. 
Moreover, the guidance document also clarifies the following issues: 
 The indispensability element includes an assessment of whether 
competitors could effectively duplicate the input produced by the dominant 
undertaking in the foreseeable future, and as such is very close to the 
concept of essential facility. The Commission explains that the notion of 
duplication ―means the creation of an alternative source of efficient supply 
that is capable of allowing competitors to exert a competitive constraint on 
the dominant undertaking in the downstream market‖32.  
 When the input is essential and the refusing firm is dominant, the 
Commission considers that the refusal to supply is generally liable to 
eliminate, immediately or over time, effective competition in the 
downstream market. 
                                                 
31 See Michelin v Commission (case 322/81). 
32 See COM(2009)864 final, at §82 (quoting Bronner).  
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 A refusal to supply may lead to consumer harm where the price in the 
upstream input market is regulated, the price in the downstream market is 
not regulated and the dominant undertaking, by excluding competitors on 
the downstream market through a refusal to supply, is able to extract more 
profits in the unregulated downstream market than it would otherwise do. 
 The Commission is open to considering any claim that an obligation to deal 
with competitors would stifle incentives to invest in the future. The access 
price set by the Commission thus will, in principle, ―allow the dominant 
undertaking to realise an adequate return on the investments required to 
develop its input business, thus generating incentives to continue to invest 
in the future, taking the risk of failed projects into account‖.  
All these statements show that the essential facility doctrine is deeply rooted in 
Community antitrust law, and is increasingly considered by the European 
Commission in its analysis of refusals to deal by dominant undertakings. This is 
also reflected in recent case law on margin squeeze. For example, in the 
Deutsche Telekom case33, the Commission demonstrated that there was no 
alternative to Deutsche Telekom‘s local loop access for competitors, although 
this analysis was carried out at the market definition stage rather than in the 
assessment of whether essential facility criteria were met. 
The success of the essential facilities doctrine in Europe can also be ascribed to 
the different approach adopted by EU institutions in the application of 
competition law, and in particular to the oft-quoted ―ordoliberal‖ roots of Article 
8234, which led EU trustbusters to pursue the openness of markets to the largest 
possible number of competitors where possible. According to some authors, 
reliance on a structuralist approach to antitrust policy has led EU competition 
authorities to go well beyond the concept of essential facility, bordering on what 
has been termed ―convenient facility‖ doctrine35. Especially in Microsoft, the 
Commission has shown its intention to go beyond the exceptional circumstances 
                                                 
33 Decision 2003/707/EC, OJ 2003 L 263, p. 9 
34 See i.a. Akman (2007), Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC. CCP Working 
Paper No. 07-5. And Ahlborn and Evans (2009), The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications 
for Competition Policy towards Dominant Firms in Europe, 75 Antitrust L. J. n. 3, 887-932. 
35 Ridyard 
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identified in previous caselaw such as Bronner, Magill and IMS Health, to 
impose compulsory access also in cases where the asset at hand was not found 
to be fully indispensable for competitors in the downstream market. This 
approach can lead to an overly flexible implementation of the essential facility 
doctrine, which may ultimately prove harmful for market players‘ incentives to 
invest and compete by innovation, rather than by imitation.  
In sector-specific regulation, a similar trend can be observed. The essential 
facility doctrine was immediately visible in the ―open network provision‖ (ONP) 
era, which echoed the UNE approach adopted in the United States. The 
overarching goal of the regulatory framework was to identify and open up only 
enduring bottlenecks, which represented real essential facilities. Similarly, the 
European Commission‘s 1998 Access Notice carried a full-fledged ―essential 
facilities test‖ according to which, when refusal to grant access by an essential 
facility provider would limit the development of new markets, or new products 
on those markets, or impede the development of competition on existing 
markets, the refusal is likely to have abusive effects and should be treated along 
the lines of the caselaw that developed on the application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to refusals to contract by dominant firms. Given this link, the 
―convenient facility‖ doctrine that has been attributed to the European 
Commission in recent years could end up being applied also by national 
regulators.  
A similar approach was found also in Regulation 2887/2000, which deals with 
access to the copper loop, and was entirely based on the theory of essential 
facilities. Regulation 2887/2000 also clarified that ―alternative infrastructures 
such as cable television, satellite, wireless local loops do not generally offer the 
same functionality or ubiquity for the time being, though situations in Member 
States may differ.‖ Recital 5 also excluded from the scope of the Regulation fibre 
loops, considered to be ―a specific market that is developing under competitive 
conditions with new investments‖. 
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However, the ―ONP‖ era did not succeed in boosting competition in telecoms 
markets in Europe, just as the ―UNE‖ era had failed in the US36. However, while 
in the US the reaction was to abandon access policy in favour of regulatory 
holidays, also due to the existence of a legacy cable infrastructure and emerging 
wireless broadband platforms, in Europe the reaction was completely different.  
As a matter of fact, the 2002 framework is based on the concept of dominance 
as applied under Article 82, and thus also based on the essential facilities 
doctrine; the essential nature of the assets owned by network operators is now 
part of the assessment of the need to regulate a relevant market ex ante, as the 
―three criteria test‖ that lies at the basis of the 2003 Recommendation on 
relevant markets, especially as regards the assessment of barriers to entry. 
Recital 11 of the 2003 Recommendation (reproduced as Recital 9 of the revised 
Recommendation adopted in 2007) clarifies that ―[a] related structural barrier 
can also exist where the provision of service requires a network component that 
cannot be technically duplicated or only duplicated at a cost that makes it 
uneconomic for competitors‖. 
However, the implementation of the 2002 framework has led the European 
Commission and national regulatory authorities (NRAs) to go well beyond the 
concept of essential facilities, for the following reasons:  
 The three criteria test has seldom been used by NRAs, since if they followed 
the list of markets pre-defined by the Commission in the 2003 
Recommendation, they did not have to show that the three criteria were 
met. Only if they decided to define markets differently from the markets 
defined by the 2003 Recommendation, they had to run the test. 
Accordingly, NRAs had a clear incentive not to deviate from the 
Commission‘s document, and never really assessed in practice whether 
long-run competition was possible in specific wholesale markets, due to the 
potential for infrastructure-based competition (e.g. from cable or wireless).  
 The Commission and NRAs have followed the ―investment ladder‖ model, 
which aims at facilitating entry by competitors by offering them favourable 
                                                 
36
 See Renda (2006), in Deep Integration. And Renda, in Sleeping Giant. 
THE COMPETITION-REGULATION INTERFACE: WHAT’S LEFT OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE? 
© ANDREA RENDA 2009 – DRAFT – PAGE 17 OF 39 
access conditions to different network elements at different moments in 
time, so that they can end up ―climbing the ladder‖ and eventually get to the 
real essential facility, i.e. the local loop. Accordingly, NRAs have opened up 
much more than merely essential facilities to new entrants, and have often 
encouraged entry by competitors that had no intention to invest in their 
own network, and ended up doing arbitrage between different rungs of the 
ladder37.  
 The rigidity in market definition instilled by the 2003 Recommendation – 
which understandably aimed at achieving consistency in the application of 
the framework by NRAs – led some NRAs to define markets in a way that no 
knowledgeable competition authority would have accepted. Not only were 
some pre-defined relevant markets hard to configure as real economic 
markets (e.g. bitstream); more importantly, market definition has remained 
very technology-specific in some markets. A case in point here is Market 18, 
where the emerging inter-platform competition between DSL, cable, 
satellite and free-to-air TV has been most often neglected by NRAs.  
In summary, given the structure of the regulatory framework, national 
regulators were called to mandate rivals‘ access not only to enduring 
bottlenecks, but also to network elements that could not be conceived as an 
essential facility. And overall, the issue of infrastructure-based competition has 
been almost ignored by NRAs in their daily practice. The features of the 2003 
regulatory framework for electronic communications in Europe led to one major 
difference between the treatment of essential facilities in the United States and 
in Europe: in the US broadband infrastructure is shielded from network sharing 
obligations, whereas in Europe it is subject to the same access policy approach 
that applies to narrowband networks.  
In addition, the review of the regulatory framework for e-communications in 
Europe has led to a stronger emphasis on the ―essential‖ nature of high-speed 
IP-based infrastructure – the so-called next generation networks:  
                                                 
37
 See CEPS 2006.  
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 The scope of former market 11, formerly termed ―wholesale unbundled 
access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops for the 
purpose of providing broadband and voice services‖ was extended to all 
types of high-speed broadband infrastructure with the removal of the word 
―metallic‖38. This market formerly corresponded to that referred to in Annex 
I (3) of the Framework Directive in respect of Regulation No 2887/2000; 
however, while – as already mentioned – regulation 2887/2000 excluded 
fibre loops from its scope, these loops are now covered by the revised 
recommendation in relevant markets. 
 In addition, EU institutions have agreed that the list of remedies to be 
included in the revised Access Directive should now include also functional 
separation, which aims at realizing equality of access of all competitors to 
the same infrastructure.  
The inclusion of functional separation in the list of remedies that can be applied 
by NRAs in the application of the regulatory framework can be considered as the 
―ultimate frontier‖ in the application of the essential facilities doctrine in the e-
communications field. Heavily contested by incumbents and by several 
commentators, the Commission proposal has been endorsed by the European 
Parliament and the Council as an ―exceptional remedy‖, which requires proof by 
NRAs that less intrusive solutions would not achieve the desired result. The 
revised text adopted by the Commission after the parliament‘s vote at the end of 
2008 states that in exceptional cases, functional separation ―may be justified as 
a remedy where there has been persistent failure to achieve effective non-
discrimination in several of the markets concerned, and where there is little or 
no prospect of infrastructure competition within a reasonable timeframe after 
recourse to one or more remedies previously considered to be appropriate‖. At 
the same time, the text calls for a careful consideration of ―the incentives of the 
concerned undertaking to invest in its network‖, as well as the risk of any 
potential negative effects on consumer welfare.  
                                                 
38 New market 4 is now defined as ―Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access 
(including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location‖. 
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Against this background, it bears observing that the inclusion of functional 
separation in the Access Directive confirms the European attitude towards the 
imposition of structural remedies to address market failures. This trend – 
confirmed, although in different form, also with the imposition of unbundling 
obligations in the Microsoft Windows Media Player case – shows that, when it 
comes to essential facilities, the US and the EU are not converging. Rather, a 
continental drift can be observed, with the two systems proceeding in 
completely opposite directions.  
In conclusion, in Europe the essential facilities doctrine applies both to 
narrowband and broadband communications, regardless of the technology 
used; it applies both ex ante (under the regulatory framework for e-
communications) and ex post (under Article 82 of the EU Treaty). However, 
both the antitrust approach to essential facilities and the practical 
implementation of the regulatory framework for e-communications have led 
Europe to move beyond the strict application of the essential facilities doctrine, 
towards a situation in which facilities that are only ―convenient‖, rather than 
―essential‖, can be subject to mandatory access or compulsory licensing. 
1.3 Essential facilities around the world 
In EU member states, competition authorities and national courts apply 
Community competition law, and thus broadly welcomed the essential facilities 
principle in their own caselaw. Recent cases include Standard Spundfass, Hafa, 
Arealnetze and Royal Bank of Scotland/Lufthansa in Germany; Free/France 
Telecom and NMPP in France; Attheraces and Software Cellular Network in 
the UK, and several other cases in practically all the EU27, including the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Hungary and 
others39. Also in non-EU member states, the essential facilities doctrine has 
been often applied in competition cases: these include many Southern 
Mediterranean and Middle-East countries40, as well as Australia, New Zealand, 
                                                 
39
 See, for some of these cases, Waller and Tasch (2008). 
40
 See, e.g. Renda et al (2007), MENA 
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Japan, Guatemala, Russia and others41. In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading has 
adopted a rather narrow approach to essential facilities, stating that access can 
be imposed only in exceptional circumstances, such as where ―access is 
indispensable in order for the would-be customer to compete and duplication of 
the facility is impossible or extremely difficult‖42.  
In addition, NRAs apply the essential facilities doctrine when implementing the 
regulatory framework for e-communications. However, some of them (the UK, 
Italy, Sweden) have already chosen to opt for functional (or in the case of Italy, 
operational) separation of the incumbent‘s infrastructure in order to promote 
competitors‘ equal access to the NGN infrastructure.  
In Canada, the CRTC heavily relied on the essential facilities doctrine to regulate 
wholesale access to telecom infrastructure since 1997. Recently, in Telecom 
Decision CRTC 2008-17, released on March 3, 2008, the Commission 
articulated new rules that apply mainly to the services and facilities provided by 
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), such as Bell Canada and Telus, to 
competitive service providers including alternative local and long distance 
carriers, resellers, and ISPs43. The Commission adopted a very broad approach 
to access policy, by mandating access to infrastructures considered as 
―essential‖, as well as regulation of wholesale facilities that are not ―essential 
facilities‖, but are anyway required for new entrants to effectively compete. The 
CRTC defines a facility as essential when: (i) it is required as an input by 
competitors to provide telecommunications services in a relevant downstream 
market; (ii) it is controlled by a firm that possesses upstream market power 
such that withdrawing mandated access to the facility would likely result in a 
substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the relevant downstream 
market; (iii) it would not be practical or feasible for competitors to duplicate the 
functionality of the facility44. The CRTC went even further by distinguishing 
                                                 
41
 Waller and Tasch, cit. 
42 DuPont Case, 2003 
43 The Commission‘s proceeding was mandated by the Canadian Government as one of its 
initiatives to implement the 2006 Report of the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel. 
44 Paragraph (ii) of this definition is broader than the previous definition, which applied only to 
facilities provided on a ―monopoly basis‖, The new definition requires non-monopoly facilities 
to be provided to competitors if the Commission determines, based on its assessment of market 
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between essential facilities, conditional essential facilities, conditional 
mandated non-essential facilities public goods and mandatory interconnection 
services, differentiating regulatory remedies for each of these categories.  
In Japan, the concept of essential facilities is explicitly referred to in the 
telecommunications law, which leads to the designation of those markets that 
warrant regulated wholesale access. In addition, the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission has been active since 2000 in challenging the incumbent firm NTT 
for its alleged anticompetitive conduct in dealing with competitors seeking 
wholesale broadband access. In December 2003 the FTC issued a ceased and 
desist administrative order claiming that NTT was blocking the entry of 
competitors by charging 5000 yen per month per household customer for 
optical fiber service, while NTT East itself charged its retail customers fees on 
the level of 4000 yen per month. This allegedly allowed NTT to conquer a 90% 
market share. This decision, however, led to conflicts between the Ministry of 
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications and the 
FTC, as the former claimed that the latter unduly invaded its sphere of 
competence.  
Also other countries (e.g. many African countries, Turkey, etc.) systematically 
apply the essential facilities doctrine both in general competition law and in the 
regulation of electronic communications. 
1.4 Essential facilities and telecoms: nemo propheta in patria? 
The previous sections looked at the birth and evolution of the essential facilities 
doctrine, and found a rather surprising result: despite the fact that it was 
elaborated in the US, the essential facilities doctrine seems to have survived and 
permeated the regulatory framework for e-communications and the 
enforcement of competition laws mostly outside the United States. As a matter 
of fact, looking at the liberalization of telecommunications worldwide, reliance 
                                                                                                                                               
conditions, that withdrawal of mandatory access would likely result in a "substantial lessening 
or prevention of competition." This language, which seems to be based on the abuse of 
dominance provisions in Section 79 of the Competition Act, establishes a fairly subjective test, 
and future regulatory litigation can be expected before its interpretation is settled. 
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on the essential facilities doctrine appears still extensive, with applications that 
are not limited to traditional narrowband infrastructures, but also cover 
mandatory access to high-speed broadband. 
The case of Europe is probably the most interesting from this viewpoint. In the 
Old Continent, the essential facilities doctrine can be defined as the ―spinal tap‖ 
of the current regulatory framework; and even when access obligations are not 
imposed by NRAs, competition authorities can step in and challenge dominant 
firms‘ conduct if it is likely to lead to anticompetitive foreclosure. In this 
context, the expansion of the essential facilities doctrine to fibre infrastructures 
appears inevitable, also due to the extension of the scope of former market 11. 
And given the emphasis currently put on the need to stimulate investment in 
NGNs by mandating the sharing of passive infrastructures (ducts, masts, etc.), 
the application of the essential facilities doctrine seems likely to be given even 
more importance in the years to come.  
The stark divergence between the treatment of the essential facilities doctrine in 
the US and EU certainly deserves closer scrutiny. US authorities – both the DoJ 
and the FCC – seem to concur that applying the essential facilities doctrine can 
lead to significant uncertainty, hampers incentives to invest and leads to the 
protection of competitors, rather than competition in the interest of end 
consumers. On the other hand, EU antitrust and telecoms policy are aligned in 
their reliance on the essential facility doctrine. In the next section, we assess 
whether this divergence can have significant policy impacts in the years to 
come. 
The table below summarizes national experiences with the essential facilities 
doctrine in the telecoms field and in general antitrust policy. As shown in the 
table, very much is left of the essential facilities doctrines in telecoms regulation 
around the world. However, in the US too little attention has been devoted to 
the virtues of the doctrine in the past few years – and a reconsideration of the 
hostile approach of the past few years is very likely in the next few months; at 
the same time, in the EU the enthusiasm for the theoretical appeal of regulated 
access to infrastructure has led the Commission and other institutions to 
exaggerate in mandating access to existing or future networks, or even to assets 
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or information that could at best be considered useful – neither indispensable, 
nor impossible to replicate – for competitors.  
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Table 1 – Essential facilities around the world 
Country/region Antitrust law Telecoms regulation Overlap between antitrust 
and telecoms policy 
United States Doctrine elaborated 
only by ―lower courts‖, 
never officially 




The doctrine has been 
influential for 
narrowband since the 
1980s, but does not apply 
to broadband 
Not possible.  
As stated by the Supreme 
Court in Trinko, antitrust 
policy cannot step in where 
regulators already have the 




The doctrine has been 
applied in many 
sectors, including 




Essential facilities were at 
the core of the ONP regime 
since 1998 and also of the 
2002 regulatory framework. 
But the latter has been 
implemented in a way that 




Commission, CFI/ECJ and 
national competition 
authorities have intervened 
in the telecoms sector in 
several cases 





The telecoms law explicitly 
refers to essential 
facilities. 
Possible. The FTC has 
been active in challenging 
NTT for its alleged 
anticompetitive conduct in 
dealing with competitors 
seeking wholesale 
broadband access. 
Canada The essential facilities 
doctrine has been 





The CRTC heavily relied 
on the essential 
facilities doctrine to 
regulate wholesale access to 
telecom infrastructure since 
1997. The CRTC now 
applies a ―sliding scale‖ of 
essentiality 
Possible. 
Australia ??? ??? ??? 
New Zealand ??? ??? ??? 
Turkey Essential facilities are 
one of the key elements 
of national competition 
law 
Telecoms policy is mostly 
based on the EU framework, 
and thus goes beyond the 
doctrine in many cases. No 
specific rules on broadband 
Possible, although the 
competences for ex post 
competition policy have not 
been given to the new 
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yet.  regulator, ITCA. 
Russia Essential facilities are 
one of the key elements 
of national competition 
law 
  
Thailand No essential facilities 
doctrine 
Regulation is symmetric, 
i.e. does not envisage 
special access obligations 
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2 Access policy, non-legacy essential facilities and 
chicken/egg policymaking 
As we explained in the previous sections, the notion of essential facilities is a 
dynamic one, susceptible to change overtime according to the evolution of 
technology and consumer preferences. Especially in the telecoms field, where 
convergence is blurring the boundaries between fixed and mobile 
communications, as well as between telecoms and IT services, the traditional 
view of PSTN telecoms network as essential facilities – at least for what 
concerns inter-switch elements – must now be thoroughly reconsidered. As a 
matter of fact, the replicability of the incumbent‘s wireline network can become 
feasible through (i) wireless technologies that overcome the problem of the local 
loop; (ii) wireless broadband networks (4G) that are increasingly seen as 
substitute from the perspective of demand-side substitutability; and (iii) 
alternative broadband platforms (such as cable, fiber optics, broadband over 
powerlines etc.) that are deployed mostly in densely populated areas, sometimes 
with the help of public subsidies. In this context, whether a fixed telecoms 
network should still be considered as an essential facility, and some of its 
elements as enduring economic bottlenecks, is highly disputed.  
Against this background, while convergence challenges the essential nature of 
existing telecoms facilities, migration towards next generation access networks 
is likely to exacerbate the essentiality of some network elements. In particular, 
as often observed especially in Europe, civil engineering works constitute the 
bulk of the investment needed for the deployment of NGA networks 
(approximately 80%). Given the enormous cost of digging holes to make space 
for one or more fiber networks in existing ducts, countries that plan to rely on 
duct-sharing are also defining these passive elements as essential facilities, and 
are imposing obligations on their owners to share them with competitors. For 
example, in France the regulator ARCEP stated that France Telecom‘s civil 
engineering infrastructure, including the underground infrastructure that hosts 
the local loop, is an essential facility, and accordingly France Telecom is 
required to provide access to it.  
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Even if the debate on essential facilities seems at least as important in an NGA 
environment as it was for old-generation telecoms regulation, this does not 
mean that the terms of the debate are the same. A first, very important 
difference is that during the past two decades the main policy challenge in this 
field has been liberalization: accordingly, policymakers focused in particular on 
the need to open existing facilities to newcomers, in order to facilitate their 
entry on the market. Access policy was thus related to existing facilities in the 
network, which were undergoing a transition from monopoly to competition. 
Today, the issue is completely different: as one of the top European players has 
recently stated before the European Regulators‘ Group, the only legacy 
advantage given by a metallic local loop considered as an essential facility is the 
so-called subloop, which is already being regulated. Besides this, ―new 
infrastructures should be considered as an investment opportunity and cannot 
be seen, by definition, as an essential facility‖45. In other words, while the 
theoretical framework for access to essential facilities has been conceived to 
regulate a situation where an incumbent player can exploit a legacy advantage 
over prospective new entrants, the NGA debate looks at ―future essential 
facilities‖, which for the most part still have to be built. This is why the debate 
has become so intriguing today, and so difficult to solve. Is there such thing like 
a ―future essential facility‖? 
As regards the infrastructure layer, the ―new essential facilities‖ are being 
broken down into various categories, and policy is now focusing on various 
degrees of sharing. In particular, the most important distinction is certainly 
between ―passive‖ and ―active‖ infrastructure sharing. The former type is the 
most often associated to the essential facilities concept, especially as regards the 
need to introduce obligations to share civil engineering infrastructures46. The 
                                                 
45
 Telecom Italia, response to ERG consultation, available online at  
http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/publications/consult_ngn_2008/consult_regprinc_nga/telec
om_italia.pdf 
46  A first case has already emerged in France, where Free charged France Telecom for abuse 
of dominant position in refusing to give its competitors access to its civil engineering 
infrastructures, which would allow them to deploy their own fibre-optic 
telecommunications network. In January 2008 the Conseil de la Concurrence dismissed 
Free‘s request for interim measures but decided to investigate further the case on the 
merits. The decision bears a key importance on Free‘s future reliance on FT‘0s 
infrastructure, or on an own infrastructure. However, The Conseil considered that France 
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new European Commission recommendation on relevant markets already 
explains that ―[a]s networks evolve in most Member States and existing metallic 
loops are replaced partially, or even totally, by fibre, the existing local loop may 
become significantly shorter than today's local loops, or even entirely disappear. 
In such cases, where no alternative infrastructure is likely to become available to 
allow replication, then access to either ducts or alternative network elements 
must be considered. Access to ducts could be an important part of any remedy 
imposed to address problems associated with physical network access.‖47 The 
ERG has also clarified that ―NGA investments are likely to reinforce the 
importance of scale and scope economies, thereby reducing the degree of 
replicability, potentially leading to an enduring economic bottleneck‖. This last 
statement seems to pave the way for a massive application of the essential 
facilities doctrine in an NGA environment48. Countries that have already 
mandated or plan to mandate access to passive infrastructure include Belgium 
and Italy (only access to ducts and dark fibre); France (sharing of ducts and in-
building fiber); Denmark and Germany (access to ducts and dark fiber, and 
subloop unbundling); and Spain (sharing of in-building fiber, access to ducts 
and dark fiber, and subloop unbundling). On the other hand, mandatory 
sharing of active infrastructure is currently limited to bitstream access over 
NGA in a few countries (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, UK).  
Moreover, the essential facilities debate is evolving into even more prospective 
and less tangible assets. In particular, once telecoms services will have migrated 
to an all-IP environment, ISP platforms in heavily concentrated markets may 
also be subject to mandatory access policy: the current trend towards 
mandatory net neutrality obligations in the US and Europe testifies of an 
increasing attention towards access of new entrants at higher layers of the value 
chain, i.e. applications and services. If markets will be defined in a very 
                                                                                                                                               
Telecom's holding of civil engineering infrastructures is likely to give the company a 
particular responsibility, notably including not to distort the play of competition on the 
very high speed budding markets in keeping for itself the use of the infrastructures and 
refusing its competitors to use them, or giving them a discriminatory access. 
47 See Section 4.2.2, p. 34 of the Explanatory Note, Accompanying document to the Commission 
Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets. 
48 ERG Common Position on Regulatory Principles of NGA, ERG (07) 16 Rev 2. 
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technology specific way, and incumbent players in those markets will retain a 
significant market share, then their all-IP platforms will be seen as essential 
distribution channels for applications and content, exactly as the newspaper 
distribution channel in the ECJ‘s famous Bronner case, and Windows in 
Microsoft. Net neutrality regulation would impede that dominant ISPs manage 
their traffic in a way that extracts revenues from applications and service 
providers seeking reasonable quality of service. Accordingly, mandatory net 
neutrality would deprive ISPs that already have very limited sources of revenue 
from their regulated infrastructure or their other possible revenue source, i.e. 
differentiated QoS fees for application and content providers49.  
This attempt to regulate ex ante prospective essential facilities is inevitably 
doomed to face important hurdles, for at least two reasons.  
 First, given the huge investment stakes needed to deploy NGNs, big players 
would refrain from investing if they know that they will be able to charge only 
LRIC-based access prices (even if increased by 10-15%, as proposed by the 
European Commission in the recent NGA Recommendation50) to new 
entrants wishing to use their networks. This creates a chicken or egg dilemma 
for policymakers: regulating today to ensure competition and risking a 
―chilling effect‖ on investment, or letting players invest, and then regulate at 
a later stage? In either case, absent a clear commitment on the side of the 
policymaker, players will anticipate the regulatory approach and decide about 
their investment on the basis of their expectations. For example, Verizon and 
AT&T invested heavily in new fiber and DSL networks in the US only after 
the ―holiday announcements‖ of the FCC; whereas in Europe, as of today, 
incumbent players represent a minuscule share of the current investment in 
NGA networks. 
 Even if players decide that they are willing to invest, the concomitant 
regulation of the infrastructure layer (through access policy) and the higher 
layers (through mandatory net neutrality) may hamper the business case for 
such investment. As a matter of fact, practically the only revenue source left 
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for investors to strike the break-even in an ideal business plan would be 
increasing monthly subscriptions for end users, something that cannot be 
done ad libitum, if the platform is to be successful.  
Finally, the financial turmoil that has originated from the subprime mortgage 
crisis has instilled a sense of further urgency in the debate over NGA 
deployment. Investment in new telecom infrastructure is increasingly seen as a 
much needed counter-cyclical thrust for the real economy51. Accordingly, there 
seems to be little time to solve the essential facility puzzle: if the new networks 
are so similar to public goods – because future access policy will make them 
non-rival and non-excludable from the perspective of incumbents – then public 
money can be thrown on the table to convince investors. And this is the 
approach that seems to be emerging at least in Europe, as will be explained in 
the next section. 
2.1 Mandating access to new networks: the European Commission’s 
NGA recommendation 
Important examples of the emerging approach to the regulation of new telecoms 
networks are two recent initiatives adopted by the European Commission, i.e. 
the NGA Recommendation adopted on 12 June 2009; and the Guidelines on the 
application of EU State aid rules to State measures aimed at promoting the 
rapid deployment of broadband networks in certain regions, published in 
September 2009.  
The first document clearly states that access to civil engineering infrastructure 
(ducts, poles etc) should be mandated on a cost-oriented basis and in 
accordance with the principles of equivalence. Interestingly, the Commission 
also states that effective physical access remedies might render imposition of an 
obligation of wholesale broadband access unnecessary, especially where access 
to the unbundled fibre loop is available, and in particular on a point-to-point 
basis. In this respect, the Commission‘s approach seems to create different 
layers of essential facilities: if the passive infrastructure layer is already subject 
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to mandatory sharing obligations, then the other elements (e.g. active 
infrastructure elements) will not be considered as essential facilities, and as 
such will not be subject to network sharing obligations. However, new access 
remedies in terms of interfaces for interconnection of optical networks and 
bitstream remedies may be required: in particular, wholesale bitstream access 
prices should be cost-oriented with different prices for different bitstream 
products to the extent that such price differences can be justified by the 
underlying costs of service provision. This basic rule faces exemptions when 
there is a proven track record of functional separation that has resulted in fully 
equivalent access to NGA and where there is a sufficient competitive constraint 
on the operator‘s downstream arm. 
In addition, the Commission clarified that cost-oriented access to the 
unbundled fibre loop should be provided in the case of co-investment into 
FTTH; but with no requirement for cost orientation where: (i) the SMP operator 
has jointly with at least one other provider of electronic communications 
services competing on the downstream market deployed an FTTH network; (ii) 
the co-investors deploy multiple fibre lines; (iii) the co-investment project is not 
exclusive (timely notice should be given to potentially interested parties who 
could participate on the same terms and conditions); and (iv) all co-investors 
enjoy equivalent access to the jointly deployed infrastructure. 
This, in turn, means that the Commission is considering access obligations from 
a sequential perspective: the same network infrastructure will be subject to 
different regulatory regimes, depending on its ownership and openness of the 
deployment process. In case of open, transparent co-investment, cost-oriented 
access charges will not be imposed.  
At the same time, the Commission guidelines on state aids for broadband 
deployment distinguish between white, grey and black geographic areas. White 
areas are rural and scarcely populated zones in which no broadband 
infrastructure exists or is likely to be developed. State support in these areas is 
generally regarded as compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty provided 
that certain proportionality conditions are respected. An area where an NGA 
network does not currently exist and where privately funded NGA networks are 
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not likely to be operational in a period of 3 years is regarded as a white NGA 
area. Public authorities are entitled to intervene in these areas, although if this 
corresponds to a traditionally grey area, the Member State must demonstrate 
that the broadband services provided by incumbents do not satisfy the needs of 
the users in that area, and that there are no less distortive means to accomplish 
the same goals. 
Black areas are characterized by the availability of broadband services over at 
least two competing NGA infrastructures (although it is not clear whether 4G 
wireless will be considered as a competing infrastructure). The Commission is 
skeptical about the need for public intervention in these areas and considers 
that it may crowd out private investment and distort competition. Hence, unless 
a clearly demonstrated market failure is identified, State measures for the 
deployment of broadband infrastructure in these areas will be viewed 
negatively.  
Finally, the Commission defines grey areas as those where broadband services 
are offered to users, but only one network operator is present. Public funding of 
broadband networks in these areas requires a more detailed assessment in order 
to determine whether (1) affordable and adequate services are already offered to 
all potential users and (2) the same goals can be reached by means of less 
distortive measures. Grey NGA areas are those in which only one network is in 
place or is being deployed and there are no plans for the rollout of another one 
in the coming five years. Public investment in these areas deserves careful 
analysis. In particular, the compatibility of the State intervention requires that 
the Member State demonstrates that the existing (or planned) NGA network is 
not enough to satisfy the needs of users in that area, and that there are not less 
distortive means to reach the same goals. 
The distinction between black, grey and white areas recalls the taxonomy of 
―2.x‖, ―1.x‖ and ―0.x‖ areas proposed by Professor Eli Noam a few years ago. 
However, the Commission goes beyond this taxonomy by postulating that state 
intervention may be required to subsidize the entry of new infrastructure 
players both where there are no NGA networks at all, and when there is only one 
infrastructure in place (and there is reason to believe that it is not sufficient). 
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This goes way beyond the essential facilities doctrine and is partly incompatible 
with it, for the following reasons. 
First, the Guidelines award broadband networks a status of services of general 
economic interest. As such, the Commission Guidelines explicitly require that 
any new state-funded network is ―available for all interested operators‖ and is 
―based on the provision of a passive, neutral and open access infrastructure‖. 
This, in turn, means that such networks should provide access seekers with all 
possible forms of network access and allow effective competition at the retail 
level, ensuring the provision of competitive and affordable services to end-users. 
These include, for ADSL networks, bitstream and full unbundling, whereas for 
NGA fibre-based networks at least access to dark fibre, bitstream, and if a FTTC 
network is being deployed, access to sub loop unbundling should be provided. 
Second, the Commission Guidelines also foresee potential discrimination at 
higher layers, and mandates that where state-funded networks involve the 
creation of a vertically integrated broadband operator, adequate safeguards 
should be put in place to avoid any conflict of interest, undue discrimination 
and any other hidden indirect advantages.  
The combination of the two documents published by the European Commission 
suggests the following: 
 In white NGA areas, the state can provide funds to help the deployment of 
open access infrastructure, in which net neutrality should also be guaranteed 
to the extent possible; 
 In grey areas, open access should be mandated even if there is already an 
existing infrastructure, and thus even when the new network is not likely to 
be an essential facility; 
 There could well be situations in which two infrastructure players compete in 
the market, but one of them is state-funded (grey areas that become black 
after public investment). Even in these cases, both players will be subject to 
mandatory network sharing obligations, despite the fact than none of them 
can be defined as an essential facility.  
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3 Conclusion: the new essential facilities doctrine 
As we have shown in the previous sections, the essential facility doctrine lies at 
the core of telecoms regulation since the very beginning of the liberalization 
process. The original focus on enduring economic bottlenecks, however, was 
soon found to require too significant upfront investments for new entrants, and 
has been progressively expanded to cover access obligations to network 
elements that could even be considered as substitutes from an antitrust 
perspective (e.g. bitstream access and LLU), and cases in which mandatory 
access did not really reflect the ―essentiality‖ of the element at hand.   
Later, the failure of the stepping stones approach in the US has suggested a U-
turn in the US regulation of broadband infrastructure, which culminated with 
the Supreme Court USTA and Verizon decisions in 2002 and with the access 
holiday season launched by the FCC in 2003-2005, which led to massive 
investment by incumbent players. At the same time, Europe continued its 
reliance on access policy, and successfully increased the number of competitors 
(but not necessarily the degree of competition) in its 27 member states. The 
limited empirical evidence in support of the investment ladder approach in 
Europe have not stopped other countries from adopting a similar framework, 
and today countries like Canada, Australia and several Middle East and African 
countries heavily rely on the EU regulatory model to shape their own regimes.  
Accordingly, until a few months ago, the essential facility doctrine was basically 
dead in the US, and alive and kicking in the EU and in many other regions, 
where the regulatory approach even stretched the concept of essential facilities 
by mandating access to various (replicable) network elements, and in some 
cases even requiring functional separation of the incumbent‘s network 
operations (e.g.in the UK, Sweden, Italy). Available data so far has suggested 
that aggressive access policy – which goes beyond the mere application of the 
essential facility doctrine – has resulted in excessive service-based competition 
in many countries, with low prices emerging together with low investment and 
speed. At the same time, countries that have deviated from this track to protect 
investment exhibit higher prices, but also better infrastructure.  
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Today, the debate features entirely new flavours. First of all, in an NGA 
environment the unbundled elements are different, and are mostly represented 
by passive infrastructure (ducts, masts, antennas), rather than fibre loops. 
Second, the essential nature of these facilities is very hard to assess, but seems 
widely acknowledged by regulators around the world. Third, the essential 
facilities to be regulated are in many cases not existing, but only prospective, 
which calls for public intervention to solve the chicken/egg dilemma. Fourth, 
the net neutrality debate affects the viability of new investment even more, and 
may require even more massive public intervention if net neutrality is mandated 
by regulation on NGA networks. Finally, the emerging consensus – also in the 
US – is again in favour of asymmetric access-based regulation, mostly relying on 
LRIC pricing, possibly with a higher cost of capital that reflects the high risk of 
these investments.  
Where will this all lead? The overall impression is that the pendulum will swing 
again between the open access debate (which tends to exaggerate the reliance on 
essential, as well as ―convenient‖ facilities) and the regulatory holidays debate. 
To be sure, the essential facilities doctrine continues to stand in the middle 
between these two extremes, and may emerge again as a potential third 
paradigm for regulating access to telecoms networks. Should this occur, the role 
of ex ante, umbrella regulation would be minimized as compared to that of case-
by-case, ex post competition assessment. In a world of competing (fixed and 
mobile) infrastructures, perhaps a more careful reconsideration of what the 
original doctrine actually meant is the only way to strike the balance between 
competition and incentives to invest.  
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